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Game Analysis of Government's Response to Network Public Opinion
Ming Li, Yuting Fan1, Yueyun Chen
School of Economics and Management, China University of Petroleum-Beijing,
Beijing, 102249, China
Abstract: The network public opinion has brought certain challenges to the authority of the government and the control of
social order. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes the network public opinion game model of
government, netizens, Internet celebrity, network media, and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyze the game
process of participants. Finally, according to the evolutionary stabilization strategy, put forward relevant countermeasures to
the government in dealing with network public opinion of emergencies.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
The network public opinion, that is, the public's attention to an event has produced a certain impact and

personal tendencies of views and statements. The uncontrolled network public opinion easily leads to
emergencies, at the same time, emergencies affect network public sentiment[1]. As the scale of netizens is
growing, the power of their speech can’t be ignored. Once some negative phenomena or topic-sensitive
incidents occur, they will spread rapidly on the Internet and have a negative impact.
For the government, how to improve handling capacity of network public opinion is crucial to avoid the
deterioration of public opinion and secondary events. But the development of network public opinion is formed
by multi-participants. Different participants choose different strategies and adjust them according to their own
interests. This paper studies the game process between the government, netizens, network Internet celebrity,
network media from the perspective of four participants of network public opinion, and uses the replication
dynamic equation in the evolutionary game to analyze the game strategy choice of the main players of network
public opinion, so as to provide effective strategic suggestions for the government to the network public
opinion.
2.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Generally speaking, many scholars at home and abroad have study the dissemination and development of

public opinion and proposed a number of social network models. Public opinion plays a key role in many fields,
such as theoretical side[2], marking

[3]

, social governance[4] , policy-making[5] , etc. Wu[6] presented a public

opinion model based on Shannon entropy and used the Holme-Kim network to stimulate, this model help
understand the dynamics of opinion entropy, and control the public opinion. Li[7] proposed an improved KH
model based on BA model, it considered the intimacy and personality of agents as well as environmental factor
to support for the guidance of the public opinion.
In recent years, public opinion can be put forward in a more plentiful definition with the rapid development
of the Internet, as we called network public opinion. But,research on public network opinion is still in the
preliminary stage. Suo[8] proposed a simple model to analyze the dynamics of four kinds of networks, its
simulations result represent that regular communities establish not only local consensus, but also global
1
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diversity in public opinions. Zhu[9] proposed the SIRS model of network public opinion dissemination, which
comprehensively measured the characteristics of network public opinion dissemination on micro-blog platform.
Fang[10] used cellular automata to construct a network public opinion dissemination model in theory, and used
computer simulation technology to verify the feasibility of the model. Liu[11] established Stackelberg multi-stage
game model, pointed out that the possibility of government opportunism is based on the evolution of netizens'
group strategy. Wei[12] established an improved Brookes knowledge equation to identify the conditions for the
dissemination of network public opinion. Zhang[13] constructed an evolutionary game model of rumor spreading
among individuals, and carried out agent-based simulation experiments.
3.

ANALYSIS ON THE DEFINITON OF PARTICIPANTS IN NETWORK PUBLIC OPINOIN GAME

3.1 Government
The government refers to the administrative agency that guides in the development process of the network
public opinion. As a manager , the government can deal with network public opinion in a controlled or
unregulated manner, and different coping strategies will lead to different public opinion development. If the
government adopts an unregulated attitude, conceal the truth or deceive the public, it will lead to serious
consequences such as reduced trust, public sentiment, and public opinion crisis.
3.2 Netizen
Netizens are the main carriers in the process of network public opinion communication. They can freely
publish personalized opinions on the network platform and spread them through the network. They can express
their opinions anytime and anywhere, and can also communicate and exchange opinions with others. However,
freedom of speech has also led to many netizens posting many false speeches and messages, which has caused
the network public opinion to have a bad influence in the process of dissemination.
3.3 Internet celebrity
Internet celebrity is usually a network public figure, they are certified on the web platform, have a large
number of fans, and have a wide range of personal influence. The comments they posted on the Internet often
have the role of guiding netizens. As the "opinion leaders" on the Internet, they are the main representative
power of the network voice. They can influence the network public opinion environment, whether it is to
publish positive or negative speech opinions, it will have a certain impact of public opinion.
3.4 Network media
With the development of Internet technology, network media has a greater impact on our lives than
traditional media. Most network media rely on network platforms to disseminate information. According to the
purpose of the services, we can divide them into four categories: government news websites, business news
websites, news media websites and representative local websites. However, the online media referred to in this
paper refers to commercial network platforms such as Sina, NetEase and Tencent.
4.

CONSTRUCTION OF QUADRIPARTITE GAME MODEL OF NETWORK PUBLIC OPINION
Based on the existing research[14][15], this paper improves the game model of network public opinion. In

addition to the government, netizens and network media, this paper also considers the role of Internet celebrity
in the process of network public opinion game, and considers different income and cost parameters in the
process of game. Previous studies are mostly based on traditional game theory, assuming that participants are
completely rational. However, according to the actual situation, the participants of network public opinion are
not completely rational, and have the characteristics of "group character", "slow learning speed" and "repeated
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game", so this paper uses the replication dynamics of evolutionary game to analyze.
4.1 Model hypothesis
 Participants: government, netizens, Internet celebrity, network media
 Strategies set of participants: government {control, not control}; netizens {participate, not
participate}; Internet celebrity {positive, negative}; network media {report, not report}.
 The parameters in the game are set as shown in Table 1.
Table 1.
Participants

Parameter

Main parameters and their implications

Parameter implication
Probability

of

Participants

Parameter

Parameter implication

Government

Positive

Regulation
Benefits

Fines

Participants

Parameter

from

(Internet

social

order

Benefits from social order

celebrity

or

Internet

stability

celebrity

Netizens’

Response

Network Media)

Benefits

Government Control Cost

marketing cost

The cost of social disorder

Government fines

Parameter implication

Participants

Parameter

Parameter implication

Participation probability

Benefits

of

Speech Probability

stability
Government

Publication

from

Reporting probability

social

order

Traffic click revenue

stability
Network
Information Leading Benefits

Netizens

Advertising revenue
media

Access to additional information

Reporting cost

costs
Loss of information lag

Government fines

4.2 Combination of game strategies and revenue
According to the above hypothesis, each participant has two opposing strategic combinations, totaling 16
kinds. Then the revenue matrix of the government-netizen-Internet celebrity-network media quadripartite game
constructed in this paper is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Government-Netizens-Internet celebrity-Network Media Revenue Matrix
Game strategy

Income
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(
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,
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(
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4.3 Model solution
4.3.1 Duplication dynamic equation of government
The benefits of governments' regulatory response strategies are

,the benefits of setting up

governments to adopt regardless response strategies are
government is

.The expected revenue of the

,the calculation formulas are as follows:
-

(1)
(2)

Therefore, the government adopts control strategy to cope with the replication dynamic equation of
network public opinion as follows:
 If

，so

 If
,

，so when

, make
, so

takes any value, it is stable.

, when

0 or

, it is stable.

is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the government should adopt the control

strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy.
 If
,

, make
, so

, when

0 or

, it is stable.

is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the government should adopt the not control

strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy.
4.3.2 Duplication dynamic equation of netizen
，the benefits of netizens'

The benefits of netizens' participation strategy are as follows：
non-participation strategy are as follows:

.The expected income of netizens is

，the

calculation formulas are as follows:
+
+

+(

)

+(

)

(3)
(

)

(4)

Therefore, the replication dynamic equation of netizens' participation in network public opinion is as
follows：

+(

 If

，so

 If

, make

，so when
, when

)

takes any value, it is stable.
or

,
，so
is the equilibrium point. Therefore, netizens should
adopt participatory strategies to cope with the network public opinion, which is an evolutionary and stable
strategy.
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 If

, make

, when

or

，so

,

is the equilibrium point. Therefore, netizens should

adopt non-participatory strategies to cope with the network public opinion, which is an evolutionary and stable
strategy.
4.3.3 Duplication dynamic equation of internet celebrity
，the Internet

Setting up Internet celebrity to adopt positive strategies benefits as follows:

，expected revenue of

celebrity takes the negative strategy the benefit is as follows
celebrity is

Internet

，the calculation formulas are as follows:
=

+

+

-

-

=

+(1- )(

+

+

- -

(5)

- - )

(6)

Therefore, the dynamic equation of the Internet celebrity actively responding to the network public opinion
is:
 If

, so

 If

,make

, so when

takes any value, it is stable.

,when

or

，so

,

is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network V should adopt a positive strategy to deal with the
network public opinion is an evolutionary stability strategy.
 If

,make

,when

or

，so

,

is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network V should adopt a negative strategy to deal with the
network public opinion is an evolutionary stability strategy.
4.3.4 Duplication dynamic equation of network media
，The

The benefits of adopting the reporting strategy in the network media are as follows:
benefits of online media's non-reporting strategy are as follows:
network media is as follows:

.The expected revenue of

，the calculation formulas are as follows:
0

(7)
(8)

So the replication dynamic equation of network media reporting network public opinion is as follows:

 If

,so

 If

,make
，so

,

,so when
,when

takes any value, it is stable.
or

.

is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network media should adopt the reporting

strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy.
 If

,make

,when

or

.
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is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network media should not adopt the

reporting strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy.
5.

STRAREGIC SUGGESTIONS ON GOVERNMENTS
In the process of the development of network public opinion, the strategic choice of the four participants

has an important impact on it. The government should take into account the three main participants, in order to
maximize its own benefits, and then make strategic choices. According to the results of the game model above,
this paper proposes the following suggestions:
 We should standardize netizens' online access mechanism and adopt a real-name system. From the
above game analysis results, it can be seen that the participation or non-participation strategies of netizens
mainly depend on the profit of leading information

, loss of lagging information

adopts the real-name network system, netizens will weigh the relationship between their

.If the government
and their cost

when they express their opinions on the network public opinion.
 Effective management of Internet celebrity. From the analysis of the above game results, it can be
seen that the positive or negative attitude of the Internet celebrity to deal with the network public opinion mainly
depends on the government's fine

. If the government takes certain punishment measures for its bad speech,

then Internet celebrity will actively respond to the network public opinion and express its own objective views
to guide ordinary netizens.
 Improve the network media channels to ensure the correct and effective transmission of public
opinion information. From the game analysis results, we can also see that the network media is weighing the
positive and negative value of its revenue to decide whether to report or not. The government can regulate the
behavior of the network media by increasing the click-through revenue
reducing the fines
6.

and advertising revenue

and

when the government controls the network public opinion.

CONCLUSION
This paper uses evolutionary game theory which is different from traditional game theory to analyze the

quadripartite network public opinion model of government, netizens, Internet celebrity and network media. At
the same time, we use replication dynamic equation to analyze evolutionary stability strategy to make
suggestions for the government in dealing with network public opinion. The disadvantage of this paper is that it
puts forward relatively simple parameters and simplifies the actual network public opinion model. In the future
research, we should consider more relevant factors in this model.
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